Expert systems vs. human expert by Georg Daemisch
ABSTRACT 
Expert systems have in recent years 
become an integral package of many 
online monitoring systems and 
diagnostic test equipment sold to 
transformer manufacturers, service 
providers and end users. They are also 
commonly used in oil laboratories 
for providing standardized reports 
with recommendations on dissolved 
gas analysis and oil quality tests 
results. This article discusses 
briefly the limitations of algorithms 
typically used in expert systems and 
in more detail their shortcomings. 
The article also provides examples 
of why expert systems have not 
and cannot replace the final review 
and assessment of the test results 
by a human expert considering that 
reports produced, automatically, by 
such expert systems will not cover 
the complex facts when important 
and costly decisions have to be 
made.    
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1. Introduction
In most of the commercially available 
monitoring systems, it is now the current 
state of art for online or offline measuring 
systems to be supplied along with integ-
rated expert systems. The big advantage 
is that results based on the established 
analysis algorithms and limit values are 
now available and can be provided in an 
auto-printed standard format report, in 
which case no further investigation may 
be necessary. That way, the user may be-
lieve that he has obtained an accurate con-
dition analysis of his transformers. With 
the expert now inside the instrument, the 
user may wonder whether he still needs an 
external human expert at all. 
It remains to be seen to what extent such 
expert systems can replace a specialist 
who will not only have many years of 
experience, but also an intuition based 
on learning on how to go beyond 
standard responses in order to look for 
and find the true facts behind the data, 
and evaluate the total complex situation 
and the consequences. 
The reliability of the various expert 
systems that are available remains 
quite controversial. What should the 
user do after receiving conflicting 
results on identical data from different 
expert systems? Should the view of the 
majority prevail, or is there a better 
approach?
Transformers are costly 
and complex assets which 
require competent man-
agement in order to avoid 
costly and unexpected 
failures
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In the following, relevant examples 
will be used to demonstrate that expert 
systems are only able to deliver standard 
answers, which eventually may mislead 
the user. A “flesh-and-blood“ expert 
is absolutely indispensable in order 
to obtain true understanding of the 
facts and receive suggestions of the 
right measures to both understand 
the problem and correctly address the 
situation.
Transformers are costly and complex 
assets which require competent man-
agement in order to avoid costly and 
unexpected failures. It will be a long 
time before we see a truly reliable expert 
system working independently from 
human experts, possibly based on high-
ly sophisticated fuzzy logic or similar 
systems. 
Let‘s not forget: transformers are hand-
crafted by humans, making incalculable 
human behaviour inherent in the system 
at all times.
2. What are the expert 
systems based on?
There are evaluation methods specified 
for various measurements, and their 
combination is sold as expert systems. 
Sometimes, even analyses from standards 
are used, such as the water content analysis 
of transformers based on the new IEC 
60422 [1, 2, 3]. Reflections on the value 
of this system have been published in the 
past. Even the assessment of gas content 
in transformers of different design types 
under the IEC and IEEE has met with 
critical appraisal, showing that the gas 
exchange behaviour is more or less the 
same in open and closed systems, even 
if this is discussible from the physical 
point of view and must be regarded as 
wrong. Even against these facts, which can 
rightfully be called weak, it would appear 
presumptuous to “automatically“ derive 
diagnoses or recommendations for action 
from innately critical data. It should be 
recalled that Michel Duval, for example, 
when presenting his indisputably brilliant 
triangle, made it obvious that all other 
evaluation methods (expert systems) 
suffer from a high error rate and frequently 
fail to shed light on the transformer‘s 
true condition [4]. Evaluation methods 
such as DGA had to be developed out of 
sheer necessity since it is only possible to 
identify the gas content taking a random 
sample, but not the gas production (as 
aimed by different evaluation methods). 
Although repeated attempts have been 
made to crack the secret of how to identify 
gassing behaviour based on gas content, 
lasting success has remained elusive. 
The reluctance of the governing standards 
to associate the differences in exchange 
behaviour with the atmospheres of 
different transformer designs (open/
closed) makes it all the more difficult 
and complicated to obtain a meaningful 
analysis. In addition, to go even further 
and cram these complex relationships 
into an automated and, necessarily, 
harmonized analysis seems hardly the 
most expedient approach. 
The problem could be mitigated by having 
a look at a few examples where even the 
human analysts did not take the most 
expedient approach, and where it seems 
highly doubtful that an “automated“ 
method would have yielded answers that 
are more reliable. 
It is, of course, particularly important 
to assess the origin of the data and their 
accuracy. The first step for every human 
expert is to check the plausibility of the 
data. Incorrect data occur at various 
sources along their chain of generation.
3. The human expert must 
evaluate the complete 
picture
It is a classical headache for our scientific 
procedures that we are not trained to 
look at the complexity of multi-causal 
backgrounds and relations when we see 
any data and results. To arrive to a well-
based diagnosis and understanding of the 
transformer condition we must look as far 
as possible into the past and evaluate the 
trends and movement of the data. There 
are different reasons for this indispensable 
practice, which is essential for obtaining 
reliable results. By looking back, we can 
see whether the data is sustainable long 
term and if we can confirm this, the trends 
can be analysed and integrated in the 
long-term understanding of the actual 
condition and its development. Taking 
into account all available information, we 
are able to paint the complete picture and 
truly understand the actual condition.
There is information and data of the whole 
history that must be put in the context and 
considered, using of course the algorithms 
behind the expert systems to get a better 
understanding of the ideas behind, and 
last not least, to understand the weak 
points as well. 
It must be understood that all these 
evaluation schemes are based on the 
experience of the people who introduced 
it in the past. However, it must also be 
considered that this past is now long gone 
and we have new developments. These 
algorithms are based on a certain stage 
of technology development, and not to 
It is a classical headache for our scientific pro-
cedures that we are not trained to look at the 
complexity of multi-causal backgrounds
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they be considered only after correction. 
If no other data are available or can be 
generated, for example after a serious 
failure, what is left is a mixture of detective 
work, prior experience, and, last but not 
least, an intuition in order to come up 
with a halfway reliable diagnosis. 
It has to be admitted, however, that under 
everyday conditions, and especially given 
the usual cost pressures, the diagnoses 
printed as appendices to the inspection 
reports are likewise typically “automated“ 
and are by that very fact usually inferior to 
the more detailed and sophisticated digital 
analyses produced by expert systems. At 
the end of the day, even these diagnoses 
require the corrective hand of an expert in 
order to ensure their logical reliability.
In conclusion of this chapter, we should 
realize that simple standardized analysis 
will not yield the degree of necessary reli-
ability for a number of reasons, especially 
as the data to be assessed requires a critical 
examination itself before it can be allowed 
to undergo further processing.
5. How to evaluate the 
difference between using a 
human expert  and using an 
expert system as a tool
Firstly, we need to examine what is behind 
the expert system, and what can be pro-
vided only by a “flesh and blood” expert. 
In best-case scenario, the expert system 
contains the long-term experience and 
knowledge of the people who fed the in-
formation into it and installed it (mostly 
many years ago). Applying the common-
ly used algorithms and limit values from 
different sources (IEC and IEEE), the 
point of knowledge and experience may 
be covered by these communities, but the 
actuality of these data is questionable. Any 
knowledge or experience that is not conti-
nuously updated will lose its real relation 
to the present developments.
Also, the idea of traffic light warnings w here 
limit values are indicated in red or green 
must be considered as absolutely danger-
forget, on some regional backgrounds, 
which is often evident in the differences 
between the IEC and the IEEE world. Very 
often these are not technical differences, 
but rather the differences in the mental 
and philosophical ways of thinking. The 
experience of a human expert is that he has 
to learn with every new project. Therefore, 
there are no static databases that could 
really cover the dynamic development of 
the reality.
4. Errors not detected by an 
expert system
The first error source is the sampling 
location as such. Inappropriate layouts 
and sampling access points often preclude 
the generation of correct data right from 
the outset.
The second error source is sampling per se 
as manual sampling presents an inherent 
error risk, although major improvements 
have been made in terms of equipment, 
and hence sampling quality. 
The third error source is the processing 
of the samples either on site or in a lab, 
where serious errors are likely to be made 
and the blame shifted to the samplers. An 
undesirable consequence is the dissolved 
atmospheric gases N2 and O2. It has been 
the author’s personal experience that these 
gases are incorrectly stated in more than 
50 % of cases. Unfortunately, things are 
not always as clear-cut as the cases where 
up to 500,000 ppm of N2 are “measured“, 
or 50,000 ppm of O2. Matters are even 
worse in cases where the values, although 
theoretically feasible, are out of context 
and not logical. This means that a specific 
thermal load on one hand, as evident from 
the CO2 and CO values, in combination 
with the relevant hydrocarbons and signs 
of oil stressors on the other, must also 
show the associated oxygen consumption. 
That results in a significant oxygen 
decrease to under 20,000 ppm for open 
design types and typically O2=0 for 
closed design types. It is the sum total of 
all these considerations that tells the user 
whether or not the data are reliable, or in 
what form they will be useful; or should 
ous. For example, a BDV (breakdown volt-
age) of 31 kV may be marked as green and 
29 kV as red. However, in the worst-case 
scenario even 50 kV can be a “red” value! 
Similarly, the “health index” idea often 
g ives the same false sense of security.
The human expert, deserving the titl e, 
must not only have the knowledge which 
is up to date, but also a long-time hands-
on experience, and something that a 
“system” will never be able to provide: 
an intuition! This feature cannot even be 
transferred to other humans, let alone in-
stalled in a “system”.
So, how can a human expert take advan-
tage of a machine-based expert system? 
The expert system should be used as a tool 
to reduce any routine work and to filter 
the cases needing deeper analysis from the 
uncritical ones. Nevertheless, even here it 
is not sufficient to use only the criteria of 
the system. A human expert must have 
his own criteria to filter out the cases of 
interest. Based on commonly used limit 
values, the system will accept a condi-
tion as green, and the human expert must 
judge whether the condition is worthy of a 
comment or action. Only if the human ex-
pert knows well the knowledge base of the 
expert system, can he evaluate the results 
being aware of the weak points and wher e 
he has to conduct deeper investigation. 
The typical behaviour of a good human 
expert is not to give the answer immedi ate-
ly, like a printout from an expert system, 
but to delay making the decision until the 
following day, when after a careful thought 
he will eventually reveal his findings.
6. Procedure‘s goal and 
results
Both human and machine experts most-
ly perform condition assessment which 
should be used as a diagnosis on which 
further actions are based. If no further 
actions are envisaged, then all previous 
actions were unnecessary and money 
was spent in vain. While monitoring is 
an indispensable prerequisite, it is not a 
solution for a well-managed transformer 
population.
For condition assessment all facts avail-
able must be used and the diagnosis 
should be based on:
• Longitudinal DGA results, preferably 
for the entire lifetime of the transformer
With the expert now inside the instrument, 
the user may wonder whether he still needs 
an external human expert at all
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• Oil quality (breakdown voltage, mois-
ture in oil/at what temperature, tan δ, 
resistivity, interfacial tension, acidity, 
colour, particles)
• Service life, loading, ambient and oil 
and winding operating temperatures, 
age, past exposure to through faults and 
lightning strikes events
• Any major repairs, overhaul
• Any re-claiming, re-conditioning or 
changes of oil (fluids) 
• The overall condition of the transform-
er and its ancillaries
• Any defects which require action(s) to 
be remedied
Based on this data, the necessary actions 
and remedies must be planned. There are 
three possible basic results:
• The transformer is in optimal condi -
tion – no action is required!
• There are some actions recommended 
or even necessary in order to maintain 
reliability and security of service
• The transformer is in the technical 
or economical end-of-life condition 
(EOL)
The second condition is most interesting, 
with two areas to consider: 
• Transformer condition, such as wind-
ing, tap changer, bushings, tank, cooling 
equipment, etc.; and 
• Oil condition, mainly acidity and IFT 
As detailed in other papers [3, 5], IEC 
60422 leads to a misunderstanding of the 
transformer and oil conditions. So, non-
compliance with the requirements of this 
standard provokes frequently wrong (and 
mostly automated) recommendations (i.e. 
change of oil due to low BDV).
Only high acidity and low IFT (Interfacial 
tension) in oil require some action, either 
regeneration or change of oil. Regener-
ation is typically the preferred action while 
oil purification provides no improvement 
and mostly has adverse results.
Low BDV and/or high water content are 
transformer problems, which cannot be 
resolved by oil treatment or oil change. 
Looking at BDV, if there is a case of low 
BDV with coinciding high water content 
in the cellulose (depending on the samp-
ling temperature and water content in oil), 
then any transformer drying method will 
be an adequate action.
BDV lower than the related water content 
is a severe case indicating aged cellulose 
and a high content of cellulose fibres. In 
the worst case, this is classical EOL crite-
ria. 
The question of how the proceed with a 
certain transformer cannot be answered 
generally. After evaluating the above con-
dition of the whole unit, the following fac-
tors must be considered:
• Transformer application (e.g. GSU, in-
dustrial, transmission)
• Risk evaluation 
• Cost evaluation
Based on these considerations, the final 
recommendation may be different. In case 
of a GSU transformer with a very high risk 
(where a daily production loss may sum 
up to €1 million and the lead time will be 
about two years), a replacement may be 
recommended.
In case of an industrial transformer, often 
a good solution might be to do a complete 
refurbishment including rewinding, espe-
cially if the design had proved its quality 
over the years. In this case, the only risk is 
the workmanship risk and there is no de-
sign risk, which is typically very high for 
special transformers. 
For transmission transformers, some-
times the risk of accepting a break-down 
on site is also a possible option.
Making such complete analysis is the clas-
sical goal of a human expert. However, the 
result will not always be the same, even 
with identical technical data. Finally, the 
commercial and economic backgrounds 
must also be considered as part of the 
whole procedure. 
The reliability of the various expert systems 
that are available remains quite controversial
Figure 1. Transformer at 
the end of its lifetime
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7. Examples
7.1. Example 1: Four GSU 
transformers 470 MVA 23/500 kV 
In this example, the task at hand was to as-
sess the reliability and criticality of all four 
units of a power plant.
Generator transformer 1
For this transformer, the gas values were 
without any pathological findings, so 
during the condition assessment an ex-
pert system would not have identified 
any problems, especially since no furans 
were detected. An expert system would 
have classified this transformer as being 
in mint condition and not afflicted by any 
problems.
BUT! The transformer was 30 years old 
(in 2012) and was sustaining oil tempera-
tures in excess of 70 °C every single day. Is 
it possible to accept these findings at face 
value (even if measured without a doubt)? 
Here is where the human expert comes 
in, to voice doubts and to reinvestigate 
matters. Reinvestigation showed that the 
questionable sampling had yielded “crit-
ical“ values, based on which the oil was 
purified at short intervals, with the result 
showing that nothing was left in the oil. 
The analysis of the internal data showe d 
that CO2 resaturation was very rapid, 
which in combination with O2=0 indica-
ted highly accelerated ageing.
Generator transformer 2
Similar behaviour was detected in Unit 2, 
where the oil had been purified a longer 
time ago, making the resaturation of N2 
and C…. gases significantly more apparent. 
Generator transformers 3 and 4
Perhaps even more interesting was the 
development seen in Units 3 and 4, which 
were three years younger. Although ba-
sically identical to Units 1 and 2, some 
three tons of oil were “saved“, resulting in 
the marked production of temperature-
caused gases (130-400 °C), indicating an 
area of elevated temperatures. On the face 
of it, Unit 3 would appear more critical, 
but when taking into account the higher 
degasification level of Unit 4 and the very 
high and fast CO2 restoration, there can be 
no doubt that the latter transformer was in 
the worse condition. 
It must be understood that all evaluation 
schemes used in expert systems are based 
on the experience of the people who intro-




Carbon monoxide 167 ppm







Total gas content <1.78 vol %




Carbon monoxide 207 ppm







Total gas content <4.25 vol %
Solution pressure (calculated) <463 mbar
Table 1. Unit 1 DGA results (DIN EN 60567)
Table 2. Unit 2 DGA results (DIN EN 60567)
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Assessing the reliability and criticality of 
all four units, after careful deliberation 
and with due consideration of all data 
available, Units 1 and 2 were classified as 
sufficiently reliable, whereas Units 3 and 
4 were classified as significantly at risk. 
Unit 4 was diagnosed as being in the most 
critical condition. It should be noted that, 
subsequently, Unit 4 was the first to fail, 
three years ago, followed by Unit 3, which 
failed two years ago. Units 1 and 2 remain 
in operation as at the time of writing. 
An expert system would not have identi-
fied a problematic condition for any of the 
units, least of all for the most critical Unit 
4. It was recommended to the client to pro-
cure at least one spare transformer at short 
notice in order to limit block downtime 
to the replacement time in case of either 
transformer‘s failure. These recommenda-
tions were followed. Tables 1 to 4 present 
the last DGA data. To understand the final 
conclusion, the solution pressure showing 
the resaturation stage must be set in relati-
on to the gas contents, which indicate, as in 
the case of Unit 4, the worst condition. 
7.2 Example 2: A root cause analysis
Let us consider a case in which a 100 MVA 
150/70 kV transformer fails and catches 
fire. What the user wants to know is: Why 
was this condition not recognized in time 
through conventional monitoring and a 
500 MW supply shortfall prevented? In 
actual fact, the standard assessment based 
on the equipment‘s history failed to show 
any useful evidence of problems. 
Even the “human expert system“ at the lab 
had classified the transformer‘s condition 
as “normal“. Besides, the bushings and 
tap-changers had been inspected in an or-
dinary sequence. After analysis of all these 
data, applying the usual limit values, no 
critical condition was determined. 
There were, however, two factors, which 
were particularly striking:
1. The entire DGA analysis should be 
considered unlikely inasmuch as 
the “measured“ nitrogen value of 
176,183.00 ppm alone casts some doubt 
on the quality of the laboratory work. 
 
The other data are likewise not very 
trustworthy, and it is interesting to 
note that no hydrogen was detected. 
The only gas to appear distinctive was 
A human expert, deserving the title, must 





Carbon monoxide 235 ppm







Total gas content <3.56 vol %




Carbon monoxide 113 ppm







Total gas content <1.57 vol %
Solution pressure (calculated) <126 mbar
Table 3. Unit 3 DGA results (DIN EN 60567)
Table 4. Unit 4 DGA results (DIN EN 60567)
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Even in that case, an expert system would 
not have issued a warning because no lim-
it values had been exceeded, at least not 
initially.
7.3 Example 3: Stray gassing
A new transformer, in service for one year, 
is showing very unusual gassing behav-
iour, which, according to the classic view 
based on CO2/Co relation, suggests ac-
celerated ageing. One of the labs involved 
found furans and this in a virtually new 
transformer this was the base to calcula-
ting for this transformer having a remain-
ing service life of 70 %. Obviously, the 
user was alarmed and started looking for 
explanations. 
Controlled reference sampling and for-
warding of the samples to two different 
laboratories finally helped to shed light 
on the matter. The oil had been conta-
minated with passivator, an additive that 
apart from not belonging in new oil is also 
causing stray gassing behaviour which re-
sembles accelerated ageing. Incidentally, 
this product may be easily mismatched 
with furans by laboratories not working 
meticulously.
Interestingly, this case also helped to s olve 
an older case where similar data had 
o ccurred. In both cases, the used oil was 
from non-established manufacturers. This 
makes it clear that a thorough inspection 
of the oil, including a test for unauthor-
ized additives, is an important part of the 
FAT. In the aforementioned case, this was 
also corroborated by the fact that a virtu-
ally identical transformer, filled with oil 
from an established manufacturer, did not 
cause any problems whatsoever.
7.4 Example 4: Heat-generated 
gases and corrosive oil
In this example, all transformers in a power 
plant broke down within a five-year peri-
od. The diagnosis was corrosive oil. Upon 
closer examination, however, this was only 
half of the story. DGA data for all trans-
formers showed heat-generated gases C2H4 
and C2H6. The contents measured were 
significantly below the limit values, which 
may lead the expert system to the conclu-
sion that the equipment‘s condition is not 
striking, let alone alarming. 
However, the occurrence of these gases is 
an indicator of design problems, even in 
surements. Assuming that the hydrogen 
disappeared, massive partial discharging 
seems to have occurred.
Based on these considerations, it is also 
necessary to assess the SFRA measure-
ment, which suggested a marked devia-
tion in the winding area for the “R“ phase. 
Obviously, this was not necessarily prob-
lematic per se inasmuch as no fingerprint 
existed and it might have been fine as it 
was. In combination with the partial dis-
charge, however, it was safe to presume the 
existence of a mechanical problem in this 
phase, especially since the fault started as 
a single phase in this phase and initially 
caused a single-phase earth fault. 
Probably by this stage, and possibly caused 
by potential shift or electromagnetic in-
flux, the 220 V DC system was so crippled 
as to render any additional protective in-
terventions useless. Therefore, the 150 kV 
circuit breaker was not tripped, missing 
the tripping signal at that point, causing 
29 kA to be fed into the fault for another 
six seconds, which had by that point turned 
into a three-phase earth fault and short 
circuit, until an overriding protection 
was triggered which shut down the entire 
plant. By that time, the tank had torn open 
and the oil had caught fire. 
methane, at 97.68 ppm, otherwise all 
hydrocarbons equalled 0.
2. The lack of hydrogen, however, can be 
partly explained by the sampling lo-
cation and procedure. It is, of course, 
a common but generally bad idea to 
take an oil sample from the deepest 
point of the tank because this is usually 
a dead zone, especially in ON-cooled 
transformers, where the oil mixes ei-
ther very slowly or not at all with the 
transformer‘s circulating live oil. In the 
case at hand, there was also a long tube 
present, which most certainly contained 
only dead oil. The usual procedure on 
location, which is to allow a maximum 
of two litres of oil to flow out before oil 
sampling, barely serves to empty the 
tube and the associated large valve. The 
hydrogen most likely disappeared from 
that oil a long time ago. 
Conclusion by the lab: As the only hy-
drocarbon gas in the sample, which was 
methane, was below the “standard limit“ 
of 120 ppm, everything appeared to be 
normal. No account was taken of the fact 
that this gas showed up in a DGA for 
the first time ever, and, given the above-
mentioned conditions, at much higher 
levels than likely according to the mea-
Figure 2. Failed transformer
Both human and machine experts most-
ly perform condition assessment which 
should be used as a diagnosis on which fur-
ther actions are based
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cases when they are significantly below 
the threshold values, because these heat-
generated gases occur only if some of 
the transformer‘s areas are experiencing 
temperatures significantly above 120 °C. 
What this means initially is that the ser-
vice life of the insulating materials located 
in these areas is very limited (never forget 
the Montsinger rule). Transformers show-
ing these symptoms typically have a limi-
ted service life of 15 years maximum. Add 
corrosive oil to the equation and you can 
expect the transformer to fail in less than 
five years, which is exactly what happened 
in this case. 
It should, therefore, be a fundamental re-
quirement that during normal operation 
heat-generated gases must remain below 
the limit of what is technically measur-
able. Limit values are completely irrelevant 
here!
8. Final remarks
The examples presented in this paper 
show beyond doubt that the accurate as-
sessment of a transformer‘s condition de-
pends, first and foremost, on the accurate 
collection of data. It all begins as early as 
the specification stage, where a suitable 
and easily accessible sampling device must 
be made mandatory. The commonly used 
sampling device located at the bottom of 
the tank, possibly close to the ground, can 
hardly be considered suitable. When er-
rors sneak in right at the beginning of the 
chain, the remainder of the chain will be 
beyond remedy. 
Equally indispensable is to run a critical 
study of the measurement results in or-
der to ensure that the results intended for 
further use are indeed accurate, as any 
incorrect or illogical data will inevitably 
lead to incorrect and illogical conclusions. 
It may well be that in the future, well fed 
and sophisticated fuzzy logic systems will 
be able to identify even these problems. 
What is for certain, however, is that un-
suitable data collection and processing 
will lead to useless results. As of the time 
of writing, there is still an urgent need for 
intervention by human intelligence to 
identify the problem and salvage any data 
salvageable. 
Conclusion
Expert systems are useful tools for asses-
sing transformer condition. However, 
like any other tools, they belong into the 
hands of a human capable of using them 
in an appropriate manner. All too easily, 
we may find ourselves in the classic com-
puter dilemma of “crap in, crap out“. 
It is entirely conceivable in practice for 
users working on site with expert systems 
to handle a large portion of standard tasks, 
albeit with the risk that the use of standard 
processes – which is what expert systems 
in fact are – may result in risks not being 
recognized, or recognized too late. This 
means that it is imperative for the results 
of these standard processes to be double-
checked by a human expert who should 
intervene in time where deviations occur. 
In other words, while it is true that the use 
of expert systems makes the user‘s work 
easier and makes him less dependent on 
the more or less useful comments of his 
lab services provider, the user should also 
realize that even expert systems are stan-
dard applications whose results are unable 
to respond to individual problems or de-
velopments. 
Now more than ever, a human expert re-
mains indispensable as the final authori-
ty to make a logical distinction between 
sense and nonsense and to help the user 
achieve a reliable and uninterrupted use of 
his most perfidious asset – the transform-
er. 
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